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THE AFTERMATH OF BABY DOE AND THE
EVOLUTION OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE
Mark R. Mercurio*
INTRODUCTION
It has been twenty-five years since the government regulations
known as the "Baby Doe Rules" were put in place, largely in
response to a widely publicized case in Bloomington, Indiana, in
1982.' In that case, a life-saving surgical procedure was withheld
from an infant with Trisomy 21 (often referred to as Down
Syndrome) and tracheoesophageal fistula, consistent with the parents'
wishes and the advice of at least one of their physicians. A court
ruling upheld the parents' right to refuse the surgery, and the infant
subsequently died.
2
This review is presented as one of several to be discussed and
published together as part of a symposium in which these rules, and
the events that have followed, are to be evaluated from legal,
medical, and ethical perspectives. This particular essay is intended to
provide an overview of the evolution of the field of newborn
intensive care since the 1980s, particularly as it relates to practices
surrounding withdrawal or withholding of life-saving or life-
sustaining treatments. Before discussing selected clinical issues and
dilemmas of the past quarter century, some relevant historical
background leading up to the Baby Doe case is presented. The Baby
Doe Rules themselves will not be discussed here in any depth, as that
will be covered by the speakers (authors) that follow.
Presentation of clinical developments and ethical dilemmas will be
followed by an overview of the evolution of specific ethical
* Director of the Yale Pediatric Ethics Program, Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Yale University
School of Medicine, and attending neonatologist, Yale-New Haven Children's Hospital.
1. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i (2006) and implemented in relevant part by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008)).
2. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Ind. Apr. 12, 1982) (deferring to
parental decision to withhold treatment for a disabled newbom), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
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principles and questions that have been influential in the field of
neonatology. Again, more in-depth discussions of these will be
presented by the speakers that follow. This essay is intended to
provide a backdrop for those discussions.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Baby Doe case, the rules that followed, and the evolution of
thinking with regard to withholding certain treatments from newborns
are all best considered in light of events that went before. Obviously,
a thorough discussion of the relevant philosophical thought, medical
practice, and legal precedent is well beyond the scope of this essay.
Nevertheless, a few landmark events and ideas are worthy of at least
brief mention. Thus, though this paper is intended to discuss the
aftermath of the Baby Doe Rules, some time is first devoted to ideas
and events that preceded them.
A. Patient Autonomy and the Legacy of Nuremberg
The evolution of medical ethics, and medical practice, has been
influenced by many historical and political events, but few, if any,
have had as much impact as the events in Europe during the Nazi era.
Medicine in the years since the mid-twentieth century has been
profoundly affected by what was carried out not only by politicians
and soldiers but by members of the medical profession as well.
The concept of individual autonomy surely predates that era, as
found in the words of John Stuart Mill in his nineteenth-century essay
On Liberty: "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign." 3 In the medical arena, in the early twentieth
century, Justice Benjamin Cardozo applied this same concept to a
patient's right to refuse a surgical procedure: "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
3. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press
.1998) (1991).
[VoL 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 836 2008-2009
836 I    
ri i l   ti     f 
.  
r t   t   ll .  
i      
. I I   
   , t  l  t t ll ,   
t i i  it   t  it l i    
    
 t   i l  
r ti ,  l l t i     
rt l ,   l     
    
t t   
 t  t t   
. ti nt t      
 l ti   i l t i ,    
i l      
    i t  t  t  i    i  
i i  i  t   i   ti t    
r f l  t     
     
 t f i i i l t  l  t s   
  t -century  
 : r    
i i i l i  i .,,3    
,  i  li  t  
'  t   r :   f 
lt    i     i    
 it  i   ;    r s i  
. J   I ,  m       y ., f rd i .  
. 98) 991). 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/9
THE EVOLUTION OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages. ' 4 Nevertheless, medical practice remained widely
influenced by paternalistic approaches, and the relatively recent
dominance of patient autonomy among our guiding principles is
arguably a result, at least in large part, of the atrocities committed by
some German physicians during the Nazi era.
1. The Code of Nuremberg and the Right to Refuse
In 1947, in the wake of the Second World War, and in response to
revelations regarding atrocities carried out in name of medical
research, the war crimes tribunal developed the Code of Nuremberg.
This code was intended to protect human subjects of medical
experimentation. Ten standards for physicians carrying out such
research were presented, and the first began with the words: "The
voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." 5 This
idea has subsequently been extended to clinical medicine and the
doctrine of informed consent for medical treatments. Thus, it is
widely accepted in the United States that adult patients of sound mind
generally have a right to refuse medical treatment, even life-saving
treatment. It has further been extended, in most circumstances, to
parents, affording them to right to refuse medical treatment on behalf
of their children. However, it is generally accepted within the
pediatric profession that the parental right to refuse treatment,
particularly life-saving treatment, is more limited than an adult's right
to refuse on his own behalf, as will be discussed below.
2. Medical Science Under Dictatorship
Leo Alexander, M.D., served as a consultant to the U.S. Secretary
of War, on duty with the Office of the Chief Counsel for War Crimes
at Nuremberg. His discussion of the atrocities of that era, and the
4. Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp. 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914).
5. Jochen Vollman & Rolf Winau, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation Before the
Nuremberg Code, 313 BRrT. MED. J. 1445, 1448 (1996), available at
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/nuremberg/.
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complicity of physicians, were documented in a landmark article in
The New England Journal of Medicine.6 Perhaps most relevant to this
essay, and to any discussion regarding withholding treatment from
some newborns, is his observation regarding the beginnings of those
crimes: "It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the
euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as a life not worthy to
be lived.",7 This concept, or, perhaps variations of it, is central to the
controversy of Baby Doe, and the regulations and clinical practices
that followed.
B. Withholding Treatment from Newborns in the United States
The practice of withholding care from malformed infants, as well
as infanticide, dates back at least to ancient Greece and Rome.
8
Widespread discussion in the United States specifically regarding
withholding life-saving procedures from infants with Trisomy 21
predates the Bloomington case, as shown below. Once again, an
exhaustive discussion of the relevant cases and literature is beyond
the scope here, but a few important events in the years leading up to
1982 deserve mention.
1. The Johns Hopkins Cases, 1971
In 1971, at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, a baby presented
with Trisomy 21 and duodenal atresia. Trisomy 21 is the presence of
an extra chromosome 21 in every cell that results in a characteristic
facial appearance (leading to the term "mongolism" used at that
time), mental retardation, and some combination of several other
health problems and birth defects. Duodenal atresia is a complete
obstruction of the small intestine, present at birth, that prevents the
passage of liquid or solid food. Children with duodenal atresia in
1971 routinely underwent surgical repair, with generally favorable
results. In this case the parents refused to give consent, the surgeon
6. Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 39,44 (1949).
7. Alexander, supra note 6.
8. GREGORY PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 216 (McGraw-Hill, 4th ed. 2004) (1990).
[Vol. 25:4
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concurred, the case did not go to court, and the child died. A second
child with Trisomy 21 and a similar obstruction at Johns Hopkins that
year was also allowed to die after parents refused surgery. The
mother cited concerns about the burden the infant would impose on
the other members of the family.9 These cases raised considerable
attention, at least within the pediatric profession.
2. Duff and Campbell's Landmark Article, 1973
In 1973, Drs. Raymond Duff and Alex Campbell at Yale-New
Haven Hospital published a landmark article in The New England
Journal of Medicine, in which they documented the fact that, in their
hospital, babies were often allowed to die. They reviewed 299
consecutive infant deaths from 1970 to 1972, and reported that 43
(14%) were related to withholding treatment. They reported, and
strongly endorsed, joint decisions made by physicians and families to
withhold treatment. In addition, they noted that some families
specifically cited their own burden in raising a handicapped child as a
rationale for the decision to withhold treatment.10 Duff and Campbell
clearly felt that parents had a right to make such decisions based on
the interests not just of the infant patient but also considering their
own interests and those of their other children. Their paper gained a
great deal of attention, and stirred debate, in large part because, in
their words, they had broken "professional silence ... on a major []
taboo .... "11
3. David Smith and the Infant's Best Interest, 1974
A different point of view regarding such cases was published the
following year in the medical ethics literature by a (then) little-known
junior faculty ethicist at, co-incidentally and interestingly, Indiana
University in Bloomington. Almost certainly it was read by a small
9. Id. at 217-18.
10. Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care
Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 890-91, 894 (1973).
11. Id. at 894.
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fraction of those who read Duff and Campbell's article the year
before, and its immediate influence on medical practice is difficult to
discern. It is nevertheless worthy of note for at least three reasons: (1)
David Smith subsequently became a major figure in the field of
bioethics, (2) it is a fascinating coincidence of history that the Baby
Doe case would play out eight years later in the same town where
Smith lived (the principal physicians in the 1982 case were both
acquaintances of his), and (3) his essay eloquently argues for a
different approach than that taken in the landmark cases that occurred
both before and after it was written. Smith argued that "the only fair
criterion for deciding appropriate treatment for a given baby is that
baby's own welfare and ability to receive love."'
2
Smith's argument was influenced by those of by his mentor, Paul
Ramsey, at Princeton. It stands in clear distinction to Duff and
Campbell, who argued that interests of other individuals, in addition
to those of the infant patient, could and should be considered when
deciding whom to treat. This remains, to this day, a central question
in medical ethics, and specifically in the ethical discussions
surrounding withholding treatment from certain infants. Should such
decisions be made solely based on the interests to the infant patient,
assessed by weighing the benefits and burdens of the proposed
treatment and ongoing life? Or, can decision makers also consider the
interests of others, such as family members?
4. Physician Attitudes in the 1970s
There is considerable evidence of support among physicians in the
1970s for decisions similar to those made at Johns Hopkins. A survey
reflecting the views of 230 Massachusetts pediatricians, for a
hypothetical case of Trisomy 21, duodenal atresia, and parental
refusal of surgery, was published in 1977. Surgery was recommended
by 46% of pediatricians surveyed. That is, most would not
recommend it in the face of parental refusal. Of those who did
12. David H. Smith, On Letting Some Babies Die, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STuD. 37,45 (1974).
[Vol. 25:4
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recommend surgery, only 40% would pursue a court order. When
asked if the presence of mental retardation or severe physical
malformation justified withholding consent for life-saving procedures
for psychosocial reasons, such as disrupting the marriage or effect on
other siblings, an equal number felt that psychosocial reasons should
and should not be considered. 13 A larger national survey (457
physicians), also published in 1977, posed essentially the same
question. Here it was found that 50% of pediatricians, geneticists, and
neonatologists would acquiesce to a parental refusal of surgery, and
77% of surgeons would acquiesce. 14
It is in this light that one must consider decisions made by
physicians and parents in 1973, and in the subsequent Bloomington
Baby Doe case of 1982. At the very least, it can be stated that
decisions to withhold treatment in these highly publicized cases did
not represent clear deviation from standard medical care at the time.
5. The Case of Baby Doe, Bloomington, 1982
This takes us to the well-known case that became the impetus for
the regulations that followed. In 1982 at Bloomington Hospital in
Bloomington, Indiana, an infant was born with Trisomy 21 and
tracheo-esophageal atresia (TEF). TEF is a birth defect that usually
includes an obstruction of the esophagus, as well as an abnormal
connection between the esophagus and trachea. As with duodenal
atresia, the infant is unable to take in liquid or solid food without
surgical repair. Thus the situation was very similar to the previous
cases discussed. The infant's physician recommended transfer to
Riley Children's Hospital in Indianapolis for surgical repair. The
obstetrician, on the other hand, felt that non-intervention would be
preferable, and the parents agreed and refused surgery. Hospital
administrators and pediatricians disagreed, and an emergency session
13. 1. David Todres et al., Pediatricians' Attitudes Affecting Decision-Making in Defective
Newborns, 60 PEDIATRICS 197, 200 (1977).
14. Anthony Shaw et al., Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians and
Pediatric Surgery, 60 PEDIATRICS 588, 590 (1977).
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was convened with the county judge. The court upheld the parents'
right to refuse the surgery, and this ruling was upheld on two
subsequent appeals. The infant died before the case could be heard in
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Among the most notable and troubling aspects of this case from a
physician's point of view is the testimony of the obstetrician that
even if the surgery were successful "the possibility of a minimally
adequate quality of life was non-existent [due to] the child's severe
and irreversible mental retardation."' 5 This is inconsistent with what
is known now, and was known then, about the degree of cognitive
disability associated with Trisomy 21.
6. Baby Doe Regulations
The Bloomington case generated a great deal of public attention,
and led to swift action by the federal government in an attempt to
prevent similar cases. The result was a series of regulations and court
cases that are better discussed by those with expertise in the law, and
will be the focus of much of the discussion in the other sessions of
this symposium. Briefly, it is noted that only one month after infant
Doe's death the first of these regulations was issued by the federal
government, prohibiting discrimination based solely on handicap.
Posters were placed in NICUs (neonatal intensive care units) warning
against discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped
infants, a toll-free number was provided to report such violations, and
"Baby Doe Squads" were established to respond to such reports. In
the nineteen months that the squads were active (1982-1983), they
received 1,633 calls, investigated forty-nine, and appear to have had
an effect on treatment in six.16 It remains unclear whether the
regulations currently in place are consistent with common American
pediatric practice or the generally accepted medical standard that
decisions about withholding treatment in infants should be
determined by an assessment of the infant's best interests. This
15. PENCE, Supra note 8, at 220.
16. Id. at 221-22.
[Vol. 25:4
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potential inconsistency was raised in 2005 by Professor Loretta
Kopelman 17 and was discussed by her later in this symposium.
7. President's Commission
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research released a report
in 1983 regarding ethical issues surrounding decisions to forego life-
sustaining treatment. The Commission concluded that in some cases
withholding such treatment was appropriate. The Commission was
also critical of the approach taken by the Baby Doe Regulations then
in effect and instead recommended that hospitals should develop
mechanisms, such as ethics committees, to oversee and review
decisions to withhold life-sustaining treatments.
18
8. Withholding Treatment in the Years Since Baby Doe
In the years since the Baby Doe case and the subsequent federal
regulations, physicians have continued to withhold treatments,
including life-sustaining medical treatments, from some newborns.
One review of 165 deaths in the NICU at the University of California
at San Francisco Medical Center from 1989 to 1992 showed that 108
deaths were the result of withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy. An
additional thirteen deaths were due to withholding additional
therapy. 19 This author can speak from personal observation and
experience, as well as numerous conversations with neonatologists
from throughout the United States, that this practice was and is
widespread. It remains widely believed among neonatologists that in
certain cases parents have the right to refuse medical interventions
including surgery, resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, and other
17. Loretta Kopeman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules Misunderstood or Mistaken?, 115
PEDIATRICS 797,797-98 (2005).
18. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 219,
224,227 (1983).
19. Stephen N. Wall & John C. Partridge, Death in the Intensive Care Nursery: Physician Practice
of Withdrawing and Withholding Life Support, 99 PEDIATRICS 64, 64,66 (1997).
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life-sustaining medical treatments. Furthermore, as will be shown in
the final section of this essay, that belief is consistent with guidelines
published by the American Academy of Pediatrics.
That is not to say, however, that things have not changed. Notably,
while neonatologists generally support the parental right to refuse
treatment in certain situations, the threshold for that right appears to
have moved. Specifically, in the case of Trisomy 21, the standard of
care for many years has now been to provide surgical correction of
intestinal atresias or heart disease, and parental refusal of such
treatment would most likely be challenged in court and overruled.
This may reflect a diminution of perceived parental authority or
rights, but it almost certainly reflects a clearer understanding of the
prognosis for "quality of life" for people with Trisomy 21. The Baby
Doe case could well be seen as good ethical reasoning (the parents'
right to refuse treatment when the prognosis is extremely bleak)
applied to bad data (the quality of life in Trisomy 21 was far less
bleak than stated). One challenge for the present and future, then, is
to be certain that parents and physicians make such decisions with the
best possible understanding of available outcome data for the
situation at hand.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CLINICAL PRACTICE
The evolution of newborn intensive care over the past quarter
century has been marked by many changes. Most visible perhaps are
the physical changes. Neonatology is now practiced in far more
settings, and by far more individuals. In the state of Connecticut, for
example, the number of NICUs has doubled. This trend has been seen
on a national level as well. The intensive care units are larger, more
spacious, and the monitors are also larger, with striking color
displays. There are many more of the smallest babies, as will be
discussed below. Moreover, there are many more neonatologists. In
1985 neonatology was a relatively new subspecialty within
pediatrics. As NICUs in the major academic centers continued to
train neonatology fellows over the past twenty-five years, the number
[VoL 25:4
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of trained neonatologists has grown accordingly, and this may in part
have fueled the growing number of NICUs found throughout the
country.
A. Technologic Advances
There have of course been many technological advances, but it is
worth reviewing some whose progress is particularly interesting in
light of the ethical questions raised by the case of Baby Doe and
others like it.
1. Prenatal Diagnosis
The practice of neonatology has been significantly affected by the
dramatic increase in the effectiveness of, and use of, techniques for
prenatal diagnosis. Perhaps most important among these is prenatal
ultrasound. In the past quarter century we have seen remarkable
improvements in the resolution of this test, as well as its near
universal use in pregnancy in the United States. Congenital anomalies
that in the past usually presented at birth, or in the first days of life,
are now commonly diagnosed prenatally. This includes diagnoses
such as congenital heart disease, intestinal atresias, and
tracheoesophageal atresia, among many others. Even Trisomy 21 is
routinely diagnosed prior to birth, due in part to the ability to pick up
abnormalities on ultrasound as subtle as thicker skin around the neck,
as well as chromosomal screening by amniocentesis.
The result has been fewer surprises for the obstetricians, parents,
and neonatologists-though they still occur. When a significant
prenatal diagnosis is made, mothers usually have the option to deliver
at a center optimally equipped to deal with the anticipated problem.
Were this technology as sophisticated and widespread in 1982, Baby
Doe's Trisomy 21, TEF, or both would likely have been diagnosed or
at least suspected before birth. It is interesting to speculate how that
information might have affected the course of events.
In addition to fewer surprises, and a far better ability to prepare for
a child with significant anomalies, there is another very important
20091
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change in newborn intensive care that has resulted from improved
prenatal diagnosis: a notable decrease in some very bleak disorders,
due to termination of pregnancy. For example, anencephaly (a lethal
congenital defect that involves absence of most of the brain) is seen
far less frequently in the NICU, as these are routinely diagnosed on
prenatal ultrasound and most often the pregnancy is terminated.
All of this is quite relevant to the ethical discussions at hand,
because these patients who receive a worrisome or ominous antenatal
diagnosis are often the ones for whom neonatologists and parents
struggle to find the best course of action. With a diagnosis before
birth, the discussion is thus moved back, and the obstetrician often
plays a central role. Furthermore, depending on the timing of
diagnosis, termination of pregnancy is often an option available to the
pregnant woman, whereas euthanasia after delivery is not. Here again
is seen the importance of every physician involved in such cases
being knowledgeable about the outcome for the diagnoses at hand
and presenting the information in a clear and thorough manner.
Obstetricians commonly (and rightly) involve neonatologists,
geneticists, and pediatric surgeons in counseling women in these
situations.
2. Assisted Reproductive Technology
Assisted reproductive techniques, such as in vitro fertilization,
have greatly advanced the available options and the likelihood of
success for previously infertile couples. How has this changed the
field of neonatology? One aspect of in vitro fertilization is the ability
to implant several embryos at one time into a woman, in the hopes
that one or two will be successful. There are, to my knowledge, no
legal restrictions in the United States on this practice. Sometimes the
result is a successful singleton birth, but often the result is multiple
gestation. Years ago triplets were an extraordinarily rare
phenomenon, but far less so today as a result of this technology, and
of course quadruplets and beyond have occurred as well. At the time
of this writing, it has just been announced in the media that a woman
in California has successfully delivered octuplets.
[Vol. 25:4
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Multiple gestations carry with them an increased risk of
prematurity, and all of the problems that come with it. This
technology is relevant to the discussion for at least three reasons.
First, it has fueled the national debate regarding the moral status of
embryos, as some embryos created in this process could be discarded,
donated, or used for research. Second, it has raised much discussion
within the profession about the ethics of producing multiple
gestations, sometimes referred to in the media as "miracle babies,"
who may be at increased risk for permanent neurological and other
sequelae as a result of extreme prematurity. The more fetuses present
in a uterus, the earlier delivery is likely to occur, though wide
variation is seen. Finally, it has increased the number of preterm
babies that occupy NICUs, and, as will be discussed next, preterm
birth, particularly at borderline viability, has become a central point
of ethical discourse within neonatology.
3. Extreme Prematurity
Over the past quarter century the survival of the tiniest babies has
improved significantly. Tyson et al. and The National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) recently published
survival and morbidity data for more than 4,000 babies born at
nineteen major academic medical centers in the United States from
1998 to 2003. 20 From this publication and others, it is evident that
some newborns commonly believed non-viable in 1985, such as those
below 500 grams or below twenty-three weeks gestation, are now
surviving. Some of this improvement is likely due to improved
treatments for respiratory disease in premature infants, such as
surfactant replacement therapy, and better mechanical ventilation of
the smallest newborns. The lower limit of viability has moved
somewhat, but most babies at or near the limit will not survive
despite our best efforts, and many of the survivors will have severe
permanent neurologic sequelae such as cognitive disability, cerebral
20. Jon E. Tyson et aL, Intensive Care for Extreme Prematurity-Moving Beyond Gestational Age,
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1672, 1673-75 (2008).
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palsy, blindness, and hearing deficits. The basic ethical problem of
prematurity that plagued parents and neonatologists in 1985 remains:
At what gestational age or size does it become acceptable to withhold
resuscitation and intensive care?
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) Neonatal
Resuscitation Textbook provides the following guidance to
neonatologists:
Where gestation, birth weight, and/or congenital anomalies are
associated with almost certain early death, and unacceptably high
morbidity is likely among the rare survivors, resuscitation is not
indicated, although exceptions may be appropriate in specific
cases to comply with parental request. Examples may include ...
confirmed gestational age of less than 23 weeks or birth weight
less than 400 gm.
21
This advice leaves much room for subjective judgment as to what is
"almost certain" or "unacceptably high," but nevertheless provides
some framework upon which to craft a reasonable decision.22
The Tyson paper and the NICHD data, however, suggest that it
makes little sense to make a decision regarding resuscitation based on
gestational age alone. Within a given gestational age the chances of
survival and disability vary widely, influenced by other factors
including size, gender (preterm girls do better than boys), antenatal
treatment with steroids, and single versus multiple gestation
(singletons do better than twins or triplets, for instance). Moreover,
the NICHD has provided an online tool 23 that enables physicians to
enter these variables and learn the likelihood of survival and
disability. The tool is of course not perfect, but represents a major
step forward in approaching this difficult question. It enables us to
give parents a more accurate assessment of their child's chances.
21. TEXTBOOK OF NEONATAL RESUSCITATION 9-5 (American Academy of Pediatrics, 5th ed. 2006)
[herinafter AAP TEXTBOOK].
22. Id.
23. http://nichd.nih.gov/abouttorg/cdbpm/pp/progepbocase.cfm.
[Vol 25:4
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Some ethical blunders in the past may well have been based on a
poor understanding of the prognostic data. Accurate data alone do not
provide the best ethical answer, but they are an essential ingredient.
As a result of the NICHD data, the conversation may eventually
move from, "Below what gestational age is it acceptable not to
resuscitate?" to, "Below what chance of survival, or survival without
severe disability, is it acceptable to resuscitate?" The fundamental
ethical questions, however, remain largely unchanged: Should
parents and physicians consider the interests of the family, or should
the decision be based solely on the interests of the child? How much
choice should parents be given? At what point should physicians seek
to overrule a parental decision? Should these questions be viewed
differently for infants than for older children or adults? If so, what is
the justification?
4. Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome
Hypoplastic left heart syndrome (HLHS) is a term used to describe
underdevelopment of the left side of the heart, uniformly fatal if left
untreated. The nature of fetal circulation is such that a fetus can grow
and develop well with this abnormality, relying primarily on the right
side of the heart, and appear normal at birth. He or she may appear
normal for one or several days, relying on the fetal circulation.
Infants with normal hearts make the transition from fetal to neonatal
circulation over the first one to two days (where the left side of the
heart takes over an essential role) without difficulty. The infant with
HLHS, however, will go into cardiovascular shock when the fetal
circulation closes and the underdevelopment of the left side becomes
evident.
In the 1980s these patients often presented, tragically, as "normal"
full term babies in the well-newbom nursery who at one to two days
of age became quickly and tragically ill. Some presented to the
emergency department shortly after discharge home. Surgical
interventions were being developed, but the overall chance of success
was poor. Transplant was an option, though infant donor hearts were
infrequently available. So desperate was the situation that one patient
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at Loma Linda University was transplanted with a baboon heart in
1984 and died after twenty days. When counseled about the poor
outlook, parents commonly asked for comfort measures only, and
physicians readily complied. The chance of successful treatment was
felt to be so poor that there was little dissent within the profession
about this approach.
Important changes have occurred since the 1980s with regard to
HLHS. First, these infants are now commonly diagnosed on prenatal
ultrasound. As a result, fewer present unexpected as newborns.
Women may elect to terminate the pregnancy, and if they choose to
deliver and receive aggressive surgical management, delivery is
arranged at a center where such treatment is available. Second, the
efficacy of surgical repair has risen dramatically during the past two
decades. Standard surgical treatment involves three separate
operations over (at least) three separate hospitalizations. This surely
represents a great deal of hardship for the child and the family, but
now more than one-half of these children can survive for at least
several years and likely well beyond that.
The likelihood of survival with aggressive surgical treatment has
led many physicians involved (neonatologists, pediatric cardiologists,
and pediatric cardiovascular surgeons) to view treatment as
obligatory rather than optional for parents. The burden of treatment,
the still considerable mortality, and the long-term neurological
problems seen in many of the survivors have led some other
physicians to feel that non-treatment (comfort care only) should
remain an option available to the parents. This stands at the time of
this writing as a significant ethical disagreement among qualified,
thoughtful physicians on both sides of the issue. At its core, it is the
same question faced in the 1980s with regard to Baby Doe and
others, and faced both then and today with regard to extreme
prematurity: How low must the odds of survival be, or how severe
[Vol. 25:4
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must the burdens be, to justify allowing parents to choose non-
treatment?
24
B. Changing Approaches to Aneuploidy
Aneupoloidy refers to the condition of having an abnormal number
of chromosomes, which invariably results in physical abnormalities
to some degree. Trisomy 21, also known as Down Syndrome, is the
most common aneuploidy among live births. As discussed above, it
can be associated with a variety of anomalies such as intestinal
obstruction, structural heart defects, and many others, but invariably
includes facial changes and some degree of cognitive disability. The
next most common aneuploidy among live births is Trisomy 18, then
Trisomy 13. Each of these can also result in a variety of anomalies,
but each invariably includes profound mental deficits, far worse than
that seen in Trisomy 21, and very shortened life spans.
1. Trisomy 21
A notable example of the changing views within neonatology with
regard to Trisomy 21 can be found in the interesting case of
extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), a technology used to
treat some infants with extremely severe but reversible lung disease.
ECMO is essentially a form of bypassing the lungs, using an external
machine to oxygenate the blood. It is commonly carried out for seven
to ten days, is extremely expensive and labor-intensive, and is among
the most intensive measures offered in any NICU. For example, at
the time of this writing there are only two NICUs in New England
capable of providing ECMO.
Some patients are not considered candidates for this procedure
even if their lung disease warrants it. They may be too small for the
equipment available, or have another disorder that makes it unlikely
ECMO would be successful. In the 1980s and 1990s,Trisomy 21 was
24. See generally Mark R. Mercurio et al., Left Heart Syndrome, Extreme Prematurity, Comfort
Care Only, and the Principle of Justice, 122 PEDIATRICS 186 (2008).
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generally considered a contra-indication for ECMO. Therefore,
parents of infants with Trisomy 21 whose severity of respiratory
disease otherwise warranted ECMO were generally not offered it,
despite the fact that there was no evidence that these children were
less likely to respond to the therapy. This thinking appears to have
evolved. In a recent survey of ECMO centers nationally and
internationally, 69% of respondents say they usually or always offer
ECMO to patients with Trisomy 21 who otherwise meet criteria,
though 12% responded rarely or never.25
This specific example reflects a more general trend with regard to
the approach to patients with Trisomy 21. It is now considered the
standard of care to provide these children with the same degree of
aggressive medical and surgical intervention as would be offered
those without any known chromosomal abnormalities. In our NICU
today, if a parent of a child with Trisomy 21 were to refuse repair of
duodenal atresia or tracheoesophageal fistula, a court order would be
sought and almost certainly obtained.
2. Trisomy 18 and 13
Most patients with Trisomy 13 or 18 die in the first month of life,
and fewer than 10% survive the first year. Their extremely poor
prognosis, as well as their profound cognitive deficits, have generally
led neonatologists to limit available treatments, such as surgical
correction of structural heart disease commonly associated with these
trisomies. While all survivors will be severely affected mentally, it is
not really clear what percent would survive if all of these infants
received aggressive medical and surgical care. There is perhaps
something of a self-fulfilling prophecy at work when one looks at
survival data for such infants. Most die in the first month; therefore
we do not try aggressively to keep them alive, and as a result, most
die in the first month. This begs three important questions: (1) What
25. Rachel L. Chapman, Steven M. Peterec, Mathew J. Bizzarro, & Mark R. Mercurio, Patient
Selection for Neonatal Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation: Beyond Severity of Illness, 29 J.
PERINATOLOGY 606, 606-11 (2009).
[Vol. 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 852 2008-2009
852 I  S     [ l. 2 :  
r ll  i  f r  
t  i   
i   t  
it  t  t  i  
l ss li l  t  r  t  t  t .   
e l e . I   r t r      
i t r ti ll ,   t   
 t  ti t  it     
t  12  responded rarely or never?5 
is s ecific e a le r fl ts  r  l    
the approach t  atie ts it  ris  . It i     
st r  f r  t  i  t    
i      
those it t   r l liti .  
t a , if  r t   il  it  i    
e al tr si  r tr s al i t l ,    
t   l   
.  
st ti ts it  ri     i    
and fe er t a   s r i  t  fir t . i    
r sis, s ll  t ir r f  iti  , ll  
led neonatologists t  li it il l  tr t ts,   i l 
rr ti   t t l   l  t    
tris i s. il  ll i  ill  l  t   
t reall  l r t r t l      
r i  r i  i l   r   
t i    l lfilling    
r i l t  f r  i t . t  f r  
e  t tr  r ssi l  t   t  li ,   st 
i  i  t  fir t t . i    t :  
25. achel 1. hap an, Steven . eterec, athe  J. i arro,  ark . r ri ,  
Selection for eonatal xtracorporeal e rane ti : eyond ity f I lness,   
RI AT L Y , - 1 ( ). 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/9
THE EVOLUTION OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE
would be the predicted survival and lifespan if we tried to save these
children? (2) Should we offer parents aggressive care? (3) Are we
making the same ethical mistake that was made in the past regarding
Trisomy 21 ?
Congenital heart disease occurs in 60-90% of these patients.
Though in most cases over the past two decades (and before) cardiac
surgery was not offered to these families, it has occurred. In 2004 the
Pediatric Cardiac Care Consortium reported data on infants and
children with cardiac anomalies since 1982, including more than
83,000 cases in North America and Europe. Of these, they identified
thirty-five patients with Trisomy 13 or 18 who underwent cardiac
surgery. Survival to hospital discharge was 91%, suggesting that
these patients can tolerate the surgery, but no long-term survival data
were provided.26 More recently, Japanese authors have reported that
aggressive cardiac management (including surgical repair) to patients
with Trisomy 13 and 18 results in a longer survival times and
advocate for offering this approach to families. Because some of their
patients were alive at the time of data acquisition, the exact effect on
lifespan is not clear.27
What is clear, however, is that some physicians are now offering
cardiac surgery to these families. Cardiac surgery on a patient with
Trisomy 13 and ventricular septal defect (VSD) was carried out for
the first time at Yale-New Haven Children's Hospital in 2005, after a
strong request by parents and review with the hospital ethics
committee. The question of whether surgery should even be made
available to parents remains a point of disagreement among
physicians, and to my knowledge no physician at this hospital or
elsewhere has ever considered it mandatory. That is, neonatologists
and cardiologists in this institution (and to the best of my knowledge
elsewhere in the United States) would respect parental refusal of
surgery.
26. Eric M. Graham et al., Effectiveness of Cardiac Surgery in Trisomies 13 and 18 (from the
Pediatric Care Consortium), 93 AMERICAN J. CARDIOLOGY 801, 801-02 (2004).
27. Yukihiro Kaneko et al., Intensive Cardiac Management in Patients with Trisomy 13 and Trisomy
18, 146A AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A 1372, 1372, 1379 (2008).
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How does this differ from decisions in the past regarding Trisomy
21 ? Here again, we see that the line has moved, but the fundamental
issue is the same. Neonatologists allow parents to decline surgery or
intensive care measures, it is here argued, not solely based on the
poor lifespan. Note that we do not really know what the lifespan
would be with aggressive management, but the limited data available
suggest it can be extended, and some survive for years. Rather, it is
here suggested that aggressive treatment is considered optional (if
offered at all) because of the profound neurological disability in these
children and concerns about quality of life. There are also concerns
about burdens to the family, which some ethicists and physicians will
find relevant, and some will not.
The AAP textbook on resuscitation has given advice on this matter
similar to that for patients below twenty-three weeks and 400 grams:
Where gestation, birth weight, and/or congenital anomalies are
associated with almost certain early death, and unacceptably high
morbidity is likely among the rare survivors, resuscitation is not
indicated, although exceptions may be appropriate in specific
cases to comply with parental request. Examples may include...
confirmed gestational age of less than 23 weeks or birth weight
less than 400 gm.28
The problem is "almost certain early death" might be a bit less certain
with aggressive care.2 9 There are also, however, other AAP
guidelines (reviewed below) that more clearly emphasize the
importance of the patient's best interest, and weighing the perceived
benefits and burdens to the patient of the proposed treatment. It is
here suggested that the vast majority of neonatologists (including this
author) would say that such an analysis permits non-treatment. One
might also wish to consider how non-treatment in this setting
conforms to the words and spirit of the Baby Doe Regulations.
28. AAP TEXTBOOK, supra note 21.
29. Id.
[Vol. 25:4
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Professor Kopelman might suggest that it does not, and that the
problem is not with the practice but rather with the wording of the
regulations, and with the AAP's tacit support of those regulations.
Also, even among those who advocate for "comfort care only" for
infants with trisomy 13 or 18, it has been suggested that certain
surgeries, such as the relatively simple and highly successful repair of
VSD, should be considered a component of comfort care. That is, by
relieving the respiratory distress that eventually accompanies a large
VSD, the patient is made more comfortable even during his likely
shortened lifespan. If this premise were accepted, one might argue
that such surgery should be mandatory rather than optional for
parents. The counter-argument might be that the respiratory
discomfort brought on by the VSD could be treated with less invasive
means, such as the use of morphine. In any case, the argument within
the medical profession at the time of this writing is not whether
surgery should be required, but whether it should be offered at all.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS
A. Parental Authority and Limitations on the Right to Refuse
As discussed in the first section,30 the right of a competent adult
patient to refuse a medical therapy, even a potentially life-saving one,
is now widely accepted in the United States among bioethicists and
physicians. Most physicians would, in most settings, make every
attempt to persuade the patient if it was felt that his or her life was at
risk. Ultimately, however, the patient's right to refuse, and the
physician's obligation to respect the patient's autonomy, is generally
felt to trump other ethical concerns. It is a fundamental
misunderstanding, however, to believe that this same right extends to
parents who refuse such treatments on their child's behalf.
One sometimes encounters the expression "parental autonomy,"
which is a misnomer. Autonomy literally means self-rule; therefore
30. See discussion supra Part .A.
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one cannot have "self-rule" over someone else, even one's own child.
A more appropriate term is parental authority. Parents are generally
felt to have far-reaching authority over their children, including the
right to refuse certain medical treatments. However, that authority to
refuse, though significant, is not as absolute as it is in patient
autonomy.
1. Refusal on Religious Grounds
A classic example commonly given is the adult Jehovah's Witness
who refuses a life-saving transfusion on religious grounds. Such a
refusal is generally respected, and this might be seen as an example
of the right to religious freedom. That same individual, however, is
generally not accorded the same right to refuse on behalf of her
infant. Neonatologists would generally seek to overrule such a
parental refusal, and in a situation where there was not adequate time
to consult a court before acting, they would generally act to save the
infant's life. To those who express concern that such an action denies
parents their right to freedom of religion, the opinion of the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1944 is often cited: "Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free,
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children . . 31
The AAP has issued a very clear statement in support of such
limits on parental authority. In its statement on religious objections to
medical care, the AAP Committee on Bioethics states that
"physicians who believe that parental religious convictions interfere
with appropriate medical care that is likely to prevent substantial
harm or suffering or death should request court authorization to
override parental authority or, under circumstances involving an
imminent threat to a child's life, intervene over parental
objections., 32 The statement goes on to say, however, that "when
caring for children whose prognoses are grave even with treatment,
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
32. American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics, Religious Objections to Medical
Care, 99 PEDIATRICS 279, 280 (1997).
[Vol. 25:4
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physicians should use restraint in pursuing a court order to initiate or
continue treatment when parents object to it."33
Thus, with regard to religious objections, it would appear that the
AAP reasonably suggests that there is some threshold beyond which
parents no longer have a right to refuse. That threshold is defined by
the phrase "likely to prevent substantial harm or suffering or death. 34
If the infant is very likely to die regardless of treatment, then
overruling the parental refusal is not appropriate. A specific example
with regard to transfusion of an extremely premature newborn has
been discussed in the medical ethics literature. 35 However, the
wording and intent of the AAP is quite clear that parents' right to
refuse treatment stops when the above threshold has been met.
2. Generalization of the Limit to Parental Authority
The restriction on parental authority cited above, and supported by
both the Prince v. Massachusetts ruling and the AAP policy, is not
limited to refusal on religious grounds. It is clear that the intent of the
AAP statement was to set the threshold cited for any parental refusal.
Indeed, in another statement on forgoing life-sustaining medical
treatment, the AAP endorses the parents' right to make the value
judgments so inherent to such difficult decisions and advises
physicians to respect their choices. However, that advice comes with
the following caveat: "Medical professionals should seek to override
family wishes only when those views clearly conflict with the
interests of the child.",36
It is the best interests of the child, then, that should ultimately
guide our decisions regarding withholding treatment. The child's best
interests are generally assessed by weighing the anticipated benefits
33. Id.
34. Mark R. Mercurio, Parental Refusal of Transfusion on Religious Grounds: Exceptions to the
Standard Approach, 2 CLINICAL ETHics 146, 146 (2007) (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics
Committee on Bioethics, supra note 32).
35. Id. at 146.
36. American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics, Guidelines on Forgoing Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment, 93 PEDIATRICs 532, 533 (1994).
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of the proposed treatment to the child against the burdens to the child.
Benefits of a treatment might include a chance of survival and the
pleasures that years of living might bring. Burdens might include the
pain of treatment and ongoing intensive care, particularly if the
chance of survival is low, and the burden of ongoing disability. These
will be subjective judgments, and we should generally defer to the
judgment of parents until some threshold is reached (in other words,
"clearly conflict with the interests of the child"). 37
The most recent statement issued by the AAP on non-initiation or
withdrawal of intensive measures specifically for the case of
newborns reiterates the basic premise that treatment decisions should
be guided primarily by the best interests of the child: "[t]he physician
is not obligated to provide inappropriate treatment or to withhold
beneficial treatment at the request of the parents." 38 The policy is
clear that withholding or withdrawing treatment is an appropriate
decision for some newborns. What is less clear, and where the moral
work is found, is determining the degree of burden to the patient,
including severity of prognosis and anticipated disability, that
justifies a parental refusal of treatment. Few if any American
neonatologists today would argue that the anticipated burden of
disability to children with Trisomy 21, such as Baby Doe, justifies
parental refusal of treatment.
3. Physician-Parent Disagreements and the Notion of Futility
In the quarter-century since the Baby Doe Rules, there has been an
interesting shift in the pattern of conflicts between parents and
physicians about medical treatment. While parental refusal of
recommended treatment still occurs, there seems to have been an
increasing frequency of parental demands for treatments against the
advice of physicians. For the three different hospital ethics
committees that have been chaired by this author during the past two
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Fetus and Newborns, Noninitiation or
Withdrawal of Intensive Care for High-Risk Newborns, 119 PEDIATRICS 401, 402-03 (2007).
[Vol. 25:4
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decades, that has clearly been the case. Request for assistance with
disagreement over patient or parent demands for inappropriate (in the
view of the physicians) treatments far outnumber those for patient or
parental refusals. Physicians in general, and neonatologists
specifically, have struggled with how to deal with such demands. One
response has been to invoke the concept of futility.
The concept of medical futility seems to date from the 1980s and
has been a focus of disagreement ever since. Physicians often justify
a refusal of parent or patient demands by saying that the requested
treatment is futile, and they are therefore not obligated to provide it.
The basic notion of futility seems relatively straightforward; it is a
common English word meaning fruitless, or unable to accomplish the
desired end. The term is not unique to medicine, but nevertheless
physicians and ethicists have debated its meaning in the medical
context for many years, and have worked to craft policies and
guidelines for dealing with family demands in "futile" situations. Its
use as a justification of physician refusal has fallen into disfavor for
some in recent years, however, perhaps in part because some
physicians have used it to avoid difficult conversations about the
rationale for withholding further treatment in very difficult
(sometimes hopeless) situations.39 Simply by invoking the concept of
futility a physician may seek to avoid having to explain exactly why a
treatment is not appropriate. Nevertheless, its use in some settings
continues, and even the most recent AAP guidelines on intensive care
for newborns states that the physician is not obligated to provide
inappropriate treatment, and "treatment that is harmful, of no benefit,
or futile and merely prolonging dying should be considered
inappropriate. '4
Whether or not one accepts the use of the term "futile" in the
medical context, it seems right that physicians should be able to
refuse to provide treatment that they feel cannot accomplish a
39. See Jeffrey P. Bums & Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST 1987,
1991 (2007); Helft et al., The Rise and Fall of the Futility Movement, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 293,
(2000).
40. American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Fetus and Newborns, supra note 38, at 402.
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worthwhile goal or benefit the patient. The difficulty lies in
determining what goals are worthwhile. If parents awaiting a miracle
demand ongoing intensive care for a child who seems certain not to
survive the hospitalization, is that worthwhile? If parents demand
resuscitation of a preterm newborn with an estimated chance of
survival of 4%, and of survival without significant disability of 1%, is
that worthwhile? If parents demand cardiac surgery so their child
with Trisomy 13 can live longer, albeit in a profoundly disabled state,
is that worthwhile? One may attempt to apply the patient's Best
Interests Standard to these questions, and still find them troubling.
Below what threshold of likelihood of survival, or what degree of
predicted disability, does the burden of ongoing treatment outweigh
the benefit? These are now the questions that plague neonatologists
far more than refusal of recommended treatments.
B. Present and Future Issues
In closing it is worth briefly considering some current issues that
are likely to influence the ethical debates in neonatology in the near
future.
1. Consideration of the Interests of the Family
Pediatric ethicists and others have widely endorsed the patient's
Best Interests Standard when making decisions regarding life-
sustaining treatments in children, including newborns. This is evident
in several of the documents referenced throughout this manuscript.
This standard requires that such decisions be based on weighing the
relative benefits and burdens to the child of the proposed treatment.
However, the decision to keep a severely disabled newborn alive
could have a significant impact on the life not just of that newborn
but on the lives of others as well. Duff and Campbell, and others,
have suggested that it is acceptable to consider the interests not only
of the child but also of other family members when deciding for a
newborn patient. This approach may already be at work in some
[Vol. 25:4
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NICUs.4' It is beyond the scope of this essay to argue whether the
interests of the parents or the siblings should be considered. It is,
however, here suggested that an open and frank dialogue of this
question is needed, and if it is ultimately determined that such a
consideration is appropriate, then policies and guidelines should be
rewritten to reflect that view.
2. Consideration of the Interests of Society
If we believe it is fair to consider the interests of people affected
by these decisions, it does not necessarily follow that this must be
limited to family members. Another logical challenge to the patient's
Best Interests Standard would be to consider the interests of society,
which will in many cases bear some of the burden of ongoing care for
many of these children, often for many years, possibly for decades.
Society will bear that burden in a setting of increasingly limited
resources, and it will be argued by some that those resources could
more wisely (or more fairly) be spent elsewhere. This argument could
be brought to bear on some of the examples discussed above, such as
the provision of intensive care to an extremely tiny newborn with a
5% chance of survival, who will likely suffer significant impairment
if he survives, or the provision of extended intensive care or cardiac
surgery to newborns with Trisomy 13 or 18.
Some might see this as a necessary step to provide the most good
for the most patients, given limited resources. Others might be
concerned that this approach is reminiscent of warnings brought forth
by Dr. Alexander six decades ago, and the Nazi concept of some
members of society being "useless mouths," and thus not deserving
of ongoing care. However, it seems unfair to characterize those who
seek a more just distribution of resources in this way. An open, frank,
and respectful dialogue about this fundamental question of medical
ethics clearly needs to occur.
41. J. HARDWIG, IS THERE A DUTY TO DIE? AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MEDICAL ETHIcs 29-43
(Routledge 2000).
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3. Euthanasia
It is now widely accepted by neonatologists and medical ethicists
in the U.S. that, in certain settings, withholding life-sustaining
treatment from some newborns is acceptable. In some cases this will
be the judgment even if it is understood that, by doing so, death will
inevitably result within minutes or hours. One might then ask
whether it is acceptable to provide that same newborn, by active
means, with a quick and painless death. Ethicists have long debated
the similarities and differences of killing versus letting die, but at the
time of this writing euthanasia is not an openly accepted practice in
NICUs in the U.S. There is not, however, universal agreement on this
question.
Dr. Alexander's manuscript referenced above made particular note
of the heroism of Dutch physicians who, unlike their German
counterparts, seemed to successfully resist the attempts by the Nazi
regime to make them complicit in acts of euthanasia. 4 2 It is an
interesting arc of history that the most widely known legal protocol
for euthanasia of profoundly damaged newborns, the Groningen
protocol, is currently in place in the Netherlands. 43 Here again, an
open, honest, and frank dialogue seems indicated.
4. Better Predictive Data
The Baby Doe case in Bloomington, and the regulations that soon
followed, occurred in the wake of the establishment of neonatology
as a new certified sub-specialty within pediatrics less than a decade
before. The initial court ruling regarding Baby Doe makes no
reference to testimony from a neonatologist, and it does not seem that
the patient was ever seen by one. In the years that have followed,
medical decisions about withholding treatment from newborns have
generally been made by neonatologists, or at least with their active
involvement. Such decisions (and advice in these settings) should be
42. Alexander. supra note 6.
43. A.A. Verhagen and P.J. Sauer, End-of-Life Decisions in Newborns: An Approach from the
Netherlands, 116 Pediatrics 736-39 (2005).
[Vol. 25:4
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based on the best and most current prognostic data available, as well
as cautious and realistic assessment of the accuracy and relevance of
those data. The decision in the Baby Doe case might be seen as the
application of sound ethics to bad prognostic information (no chance
of any quality of life). It is incumbent on neonatologists to seek and
use reliable prognostic information when counseling parents and
attempting to resolve difficult questions about withholding treatment.
The Tyson paper and the Outcome Estimator based on the NICHD
database represent major progress in that regard. Much more work
needs to be done in other aspects of neonatal care and prognosis.
And, where there are no reliable data upon which to rely, physicians
need to be honest with parents, and with themselves, that such is the
case. Even in the face of a most thoughtful and sophisticated ethical
deliberation, bad decisions might be reached if bad data are applied.
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